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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION: CONTAGIOUS DISEASE
HELD COMPENSABLE
GENERALLY, workmen's compensation statutes recognize as compen-
sable only those accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of
employment.' The recent case of Hines v. Industrial Accident Bd.'
represents an expansion of compensability by allowing a widow to
recover for her husband's death from poliomyelitis, in the face of clear
statutory language that "injury' or 'injured' refers only to an injury
resulting from some fortuitous event, as distinguished from the con-
traction of disease."'3
For three days prior to becoming ill the employee had engaged in
strenuous labor near an open storm sewer and garbage trucks which
occasionally contained human wastes. The trial court, reversing a find-
ing of the Industrial Accident Board, held that the employee's contrac-
tion of disease and resulting death constituted a compensable injury.
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, two justices dissenting. The
court relied upon medical testimony at the trial that polio is an infectious,
contagious disease and, although scientific knowledge concerning the
'E.g., MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 9.-614 (1947). "Every employer . .. shall be
liable for the payment of compensation . . . to an employee . . . who shall receive an
injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. . . ." § 9z-4i8, requiring
that the injury result "from some fortuitous event," has been interpreted in the same
manner as "accident" provisions in other jurisdictions. Nicholson v. Roundup Coal
Mining Co., 79 Mont. 358, z57 P. 270 (1927).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2 (1958)- "'Injury and personal injury' shall mean only
injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. . . ." § 97-9
"Every employer . . . shall only be liable to any employee . . . for personal injury ...
by accident. .... 
N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMP. LAW § 2 " 'Injury' and 'personal injury' mean only
accidental injuries .... " § io "Every employer . . . [shall] secure compensation to his
employees . . . for their disability or death from injury arising out of and in the course
of the employment. .. 2'
2- Mont. -, 358 P.zd 447 (.960).
8 MONT. REV. ConEs ANN. § 9z-418 (1947).
The Montana legislature reacted to the instant decision by amending the statute to
read: c1' Injury' or 'injured' means a tangible happening of a traumatic nature from an
unexpected cause resulting in either external or internal physical harm . . . excluding
diseases not traceable to injury." Laws of Montana, 1961 ch. 16z. This amendment
doubtless was intended to repudiate the instant decision. 2Z MONT. L. REV. 191, 195
(596i). However, the interpretation of similar wording in other statutes indicates a
lack of agreement on the meaning. Compare cases cited note s 2 infra, vith Stuckey v.
City of Alexandria, 81 So.2d 46 (La. App. .955).
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transmission of polio is somewhat inconclusive, the claimant's evidence
tended to show that the virus may exist in and be transported by contact
with sewage and human wastes. The court also recognized disputed
testimony that the fatigue of strenuous labor, while not in itself a
cause of decedent's illness, could possibly have contributed thereto.
The dissent vigorously maintained that the majority's abrogation of
an express statutory exclusion of disease from compensability was "noth-
ing but gross judicial legislation." 4  Moreover, in none of the prece-
dents relied upon by the majority was the mere contraction of disease
held to be compensable.5
An employee disabled by a contagious disease usually may seek an
award under either the general compensation statute or under occupa-
tional disease provisions. Generally, occupational disease provisions
require only that the claimant prove that the disease resulted from ex-
posure to deleterious conditions common to the type of occupation
engaged in.6 The award is dependent upon the type of occupational
disease statute applicable, since some statutes recognize certain diseases
as compensable and specifically exclude others."
On the other hand, to receive an award under a general workman's
compensation statute, the claimant usually must show an accidental
injury.' Although such provisions sometimes have been construed to
preclude recovery for contagious diseases,' 0 the majority of courts hold
4 358 P.zd at 454.
'The Montana decisions are extensively analyzed in z2 MONT. L. REV. 191 (961).
"Occupational disease" is frequently a term of art requiring interpretation. In
its generic sense it usually has reference to ailments resulting from a continual exposure
to a harmful element inherent in the type of employment, such as silicosis due to a mine
worker's inhalation of silica dust. However, the trend now seems to be toward a broader
view under which recovery is allowed for diseases that are actually a risk of the em-
ployment in that they were contracted while working. See e.g., Gray v. City of St.
Paul, z5o Minn. zzo, 84 N.W.zd 6o6 (1957). See note 23 infra.
' The statute applicable in the instant case recognizes only two diseases, silicosis and
anthrax, and several specified types of poisoning as compensible. Employers may insure
against other diseases, but a rather redundant proximate-cause subsection seriously limits
the provisions. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 92-1304, -1305 (Supp. 1959). Compare
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-53 (1958) (listing 27 various diseases and poisonings) with
MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 4g.1z (1948) (general definition, no schedule).
'E.g., MONT. REV. CODEs ANN. § 9z-1304 (Supp. 1959). "The following diseases
only shall be termed occupational diseases." (Emphasis added.) GA. CODE ANN.
§ 114-803 (1956) ". . . [T~he term 'occupational disease' shall iclude only those dis-
eases hereinafter listed. .... " (Emphasis added.)
' E.g., the statutory provisions listed in note z supra.
"0 Hoffman v. Consumers Water Co., 61 Idaho zz6, 99 P.2d 99 (1940) (extensive
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that an unusual exposure1 or an unexpected result' 2 is sufficiently fortui-
tous to constitute an "accident." Furthermore, because at one time the
term "injury" was felt to require a traumatic physical disturbance,'13
early cases frequently predicated recovery upon the existence of some
lesion such as a scratch,' 4 insect bite,' 5 or pimple.'" The modem and
better view, however, is that the infection with the disease is itself suffi-
cient "injury" to allow compensation' 7 barring a specific exclusionary
statutory provision.' s
Whether proceeding under the general provisions or under an
occupational disease statute, the claimant must prove that the disease is
sufficiently connected with the employment." Several approaches have
citation of authorities) ; Stuckey v. City of Alexandria, S So. zd 46 (La. App. 1955) ;
Basil v. Butterworth Hosp. 272 Mich. 439, 762 N.W. zSi (935);
Some courts have held that to be "accidental," a disease must be ascribable to a
specific and definite event. Connelly v. Hunt Furniture Co., 24.o N.Y. 83, 147 N.E. 366
(x9a5) Meyer v. Roettele, 64 S.D. 36, z64. N.W. 191 (1935); Gabbard v. Proctor
& Gamble Defense Corp., 084 Tenn. 464, ao S.W.zd 651 ('947). Other courts,
however, point out that an accident can include several steps, and extend over a period
of time. Adams v. Bryant, 74. S.W.zd 791 (Ky. '955); Rinehart v. F.M. Stamper
Co., 227 Mo. App. 653, 55 S.W.ad 729 (193a).
"Allen v. Public Service Co., 122 Ind. App. 421, 104 N.E.ad 756 (195.) (by
implication) ; Rinehart v. F.M. Stamper Co., supra note io; Meyer v. Roettele, supra
note io; Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Hay, 159 Tenn. 202, 17 S.W.ad 904 (1929).
" Permanent Const. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 380 Ill. 47, 43 N.E.2d 557 (1942);
Adams v. Bryant, 274 S.W.2d 791 (Ky. 1955); Stevenson v. Lee Moore Contracting
Co., 45 N.M. 354, ii5 P.ad 342 0941).
"'Smith's Case, 307 Mass. S16, 3o N.E.2d 536 (1940).
The "trauma" requirement may be incorporated in the statute. E.g., Ky. REv.
STAT. § 342.05 (x959). This statute has been interpreted to allow recovery for
tularemia. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Sexton, z42 Ky. 266, 46 S.W.ad 87 (932).
Although the Ohio Supreme Court considers diseases to satisfy the requirement of a
trauma, through a syllogistic analysis involving the occupational disease statute that
court has precluded recovery for diseases contracted by accident. Johnson v. Industrial
Comm'n, 164 Ohio St. 297, 13o N.E.ad 807 (955).
" Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, z91 Ill. 616, 126 N.E. 616
(1920) ; Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Sexton, supra note 13; Droddy v. Industiral
Lumber Co., 143 So. 117 (La. App. 1932); De Tura v. Eastern Meat Markets, Inc.,
3 App. Div. 2d 486, x6a N.Y.S.2d. 237 (1957).
"Roe v. Boise Grocery Co., 53 Idaho 82, 21 P.ad 910 (933).
" Connelly v. Hunt Furniture Co., 24o N.Y. 83, 147 N.E. 366 (1925); Hartford
Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Hay, 159 Tenn. Zo2, 17 S.W.ad 904 (.9-9).
"Ford v. Goode, 24o Iowa 1219, 38 N.W.2d 158 (1949); Union Mining Co. v.
Blank, x8 Md. 6z, a8 A.zd 568 (1942) ; Morrison's Case, 33z Mass. 658, 127 N.E.ad
191 (1955).
" Stuckey v. City of Alexandria, 81 So. 2d 46 (La. App. 1955).
"This is usually codified by requiring that the injury "arise out of and in the
course of the employment." See the illustrative statutory provisions quoted in note' C
supra.
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been utilized in resolving this problem. The majority of courts require
that the employee must have been subjected to a greater risk of infection
than are people in the general community.20 A growing minority allow
recovery if the infection is an actual risk of the employment, irrespective
of the risk to the public at large.21 A few courts even permit recovery
for those diseases actually contracted while the employee was at work,
despite the absence of any increased or actual risk caused by the
employment.22
The instant decision is indicative of a recent tendency of many courts
to apply an actual risk test while ostensibly requiring an increased risk.28
20Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 22 Cal. 2d 742, 135 P.2d 153
(1943) ; Permanent Const. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 380 Ill. 47, 43 N.E.2d 557
(1942); 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 8.50 (1952).
The determination of what constitutes the "general community" has been the subject
of litigation. It was contended in one case that because all residents of the San Joaquin
valley in California were equally exposed to a fungus endemic to that area, a salesman
traveling there was not subjected to a greater risk of infection from that fungus. The
court held, however, that because the disease was not a danger at his home in San
Francisco, and because the natives of the valley had a degree of immunity, the salesman
was subjected to a greater risk. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n,
i8 Cal. 2d 622, 122 P.zd 570 (2942). Accord, Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 221
F.zd 886 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (employee contracted tuberculosis in Japan, where the rate
of incidence is 5 times higher than in United States) ; Lepow v. Lepow Knitting Mills,
Inc., z88 N.Y. 377, 43 N.E.zd 450 (1942) (salesman from New York contracted
malaria in Africa).
"1 Schwitzer-Cummins Co. v. Hacker, 123 Ind. App. 674, 112 N.E.2d 221 (1953);
Ford v. Goode, 240 Iowa 1219, 38 N.W.zd 158 (1949) 5 Hovancik v. General Aniline
& Film Corp., 8 App. Div. 2d 171, 187 N.Y.S.2d 28 (.959).
"Gray v. City of St. Paul, 25o Minn. 220, 84 N.W.2d 6o6 (1957); Reynolds v.
General Motors Corp., 38 N.J. Super. 274, 2,8 A.zd 724 (.955).
2" This is frequently done by finding the fortuitous presence of the infecting person
or object at the place of employment to be an increased risk. Allen v. Public Service
Co., 122 Ind. App. 421, io4 N.E.2d 756 (1952) (by implication); Roe v. Boise
Grocery Co., 53 Idaho 82, 21 P.2d 91o (1933) ; Gray v. City of St. Paul, suepra note 22.
The New York decisions draw an hypertechnical distinction. A disease contracted
directly from a fellow-employee is not compensable, but one contracted from that em-
ployee because the workers use a common instrument is compensable. Compare Harman
v. Republic Aviation Corp., 298 N.Y. 285, 8z N.E.zd 785 (2948) (tuberculosis con-
tracted directly from fellow-worker not compensable), 'with Hovancik v. General Aniline
& Film Corp., 8 App. Div. 2d 171, 187 N.Y.S.zd 28 (x959) (tuberculosis from com-
monly-used pipette), and Mason v. Y.W.C.A., 271 App. Div. 1042, 68 N.Y.S.2d Sxo,
appeal denied, 297 N.Y. 2037, 74 N.E.2d 486 (1947) (tuberculosis from commonly-
used telephone mouthpiece).
A recent Arkansas decision examined this problem in a case where a worker contracted
ischial bursitis from continuous sitting while working. Although recovery was allowed,
only three members of the seven man court based their decision on a peculiar risk
necessary to an occupational disease. One judge concurred upon the basis that there
was an "accidental injury." Three judges dissented, contending there was neither an
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Infection with contagious disease would seem to be a danger universal
to the general public, and hence compensable only in an "actual risk"
jurisdiction. If however, there are unusual circumstances such as those
peculiar to hospital employees24 or, arguably, as were present in the
instant case, compensation would be proper in those jurisdictions re-
quiring an "increased risk." Explicit recognition of such reasoning
would greatly reduce the possibility of recovery for contagious diseases
either as an occupational disease or in the "increased risk" jurisdictions.2 5
However, the actual risk test would seem to be the more enlightened
position in view of the policy of liberality in construing compensation
statutes.
Consequently, the most difficult aspect of the majority of contagious
disease cases is the evidentiary problem of proving where and when the
disease was actually contracted. 26  The court in the instant case takes a
debatable position in allowing reversal of the Accident Board to rest
upon a rather tenuous inferential chain of possibilities27 that the disease
accidental injury nor an occupational disease. Brown Shoe Co. v. Fooks, zz8 Ark. 8x5,
310 S.W.zd 8x6 (1958).
"The ultimate working rule that seems to emerge is simply that a disability which
would be held to arise out of the employment under the increased-risk test will be
treated as an occupational disease." x LARSON, o0p. cit. supra note 2o at 61z (1952).
"E.g., City & County of San Francisco v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, x83 Cal. 273,
x91 P. z6 (1920) j Mills v. Detroit Tuberculosis Sanitarium, 323 Mich. zoo, 35
N.W.2d 239 (1948) Otten v. State, z 9 Minn. 488, 4o N.W.zd 81 (1949). There
are, however, cases denying recovery to hospital employees in such situations. Children's
Hosp. Soc'y v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 22 Cal. App. zd 365, 71 P.2d 83 (1937);
Basil v. Butterworth Hosp., 272 Mich. 4-39, 262 N.W. 281 (1935) i State v. Sims, 130
W. Va. 430, 43 S.E.zd 8o5 (i97).
sSmith's Case, 307 Mass. 516, 30 N.E.2d 536 (1940)i Harman v. Republic
Aviation Corp., 298 N.Y. 285, 8z N.E.2d 785 (1948).
"See e.g., Treadway v. Industrial Comm'n, 69 Ariz. 301, 213 P.2d 373 (950);
Children's Hosp. Soc'y v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, z Cal. App. 2d 365, 71 P.2d 83
(1937) i Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Vaughn, 174 S.W.zd iooi (Tex. Civ. App.
1943.)
In allowing recovery for tularemia, the Iowa Supreme Court said: "The question is
one of proof-of tracing the injury to its origin, to see if it lies in the performance of
the employee's work. . . . [Qince we say disease .. .is included in the term 'personal
injury' ... the award . . .depends upon the evidence showing it had its occasion in the
performance of the employee's duties." Ford v. Goode, 240 Iowa 1219, - , 38
N.W.ad 158, I6o (-949).
C [I]n compensation law, as in all administrative law, an award may be reversed
if not supported by any evidence. Conversely, since the compensation board has expressly
been entrusted with the power to find facts, its fact finding must be affirmed if sup-
ported by any evidence, even if the reviewing court thinks the evidence points the other
way. This Statement is, without any close competition, the number-one clich6 of
compensation law. . . " 2 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 2o at 317-18.
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was contracted in the manner alleged.28  Most courts probably would
require a stronger showing.29
The general objective of workmen's compensation is to spread the
cost of a worker's disability, attributable to his employment, over that
segment of the community which receives the benefit of his employment.
The instant decision is indicative of a continuous expansion of coverage
under these acts.3 However, to conclude that polio arises out of the
employment upon evidence that the disease might have been contracted
from sewage which might possibly have contained the virus seems rather
extreme. Such decisions tend to make the employer a general insurer
against all the contagious diseases to which his workers may be prone."
It is desirable that such an expansion of coverage be legislatively im-
plemented.
-8 After pointing out the relative ease of proving the injury arose from the employ-
ment when there has been a distinct physical change, one early commentator concluded:
"The difficulty which will arise if compensation is allowed for disease lies in the fact
that not only its existence but its origin can as a rule be proved only by the testimony
of the sufferer himself, corroborated by the testimony of his physician, which usually
goes no further than a statement that the disease might be caused by some incident of
the employment. Such claims are not only particularly easy to fabricate, but there is
a great tendency in a sufferer to ascribe, without conscious dishonesty, his illness to
some cause from which he may hope to obtain relief. But even if they are honestly put
forward, the success or failure of such claims must depend upon a highly doubtful issue
of fact." Bohlen, A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25
HARV. L. REV. 328, 344-45 (1912).
"Treadway v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 69 Ariz. 301, 213 P.2d 373 (1950);
Children's Hosp. Soc'y v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 22 Cal. App. 2d 365, 7! P.2d 83
(i937) ; Stuckey v. City of Alexandria, 81 So. zd 46 (La. App. 19s5) ; Mickelson v.
Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 89 N.W.zd 89 (N.D. 1958); Lumbermen's Mut. Cas.
Co. v. Vaughn, 174 S.W.2d ioox (Tex. Civ. App. 1943). But see, Pacific Employers
Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, is Cal. 2d 622, 122 P.2d 570 (1942); City &
County of San Francisco v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 183 Cal. 2731 191 Pac. z6 (1920);
Roe v. Boise Grocery Co., 53 Idaho 8z, 21 P.zd gio (1933)0
'oRiesenfeld, Forty Years of American Workmen's Compensation, 7 NACCA L.J.
15, 23 (95).
"Professor Larson recognizes this danger and points out that the work-connection
requirement "stands as a bulwark against indiscriminate awards for the common dis-
eases to which everyone is subject." LARSON, op. cit. supra note 2o at 593.
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